ABSTRACT In the field of social survey of misconduct and legal consultation, the features of confidentiality, integrity, deniable authentication, and non-repudiation are needed for the sake of preserving privacy. For this special kind of application scenario, we propose an efficient deniable authentication encryption scheme. Our scheme can achieve the four secure features in a single logical step. And compared with the latest scheme, our scheme reduces the computational cost of encryption by about 30%, reduces computational cost of decryption by about 50%, and reduces the length of ciphertext by about 33%. Its security is shown in the random oracle model.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are some scenarios where people have to discuss some things with a particular person and people don't want to disclose what he says after conversation. For example a patient with special diseases such as HIV consults doctors about the treatment. The patient is unwilling to disclose what he or she discusses with the doctor. Another example is conversation between criminal suspects and lawyers. The criminal suspect has to discuss what he actually did with his lawyer, but the criminal suspect wants to make sure that the lawyer is unable to show what he said in the conversation to the judge.
Privacy protection of conversation is a legitimate need, but it always depends on morality of practitioners. It is a consensus that doctors and lawyers should keep silent about patients' condition and what a criminal suspect says. However, the reality varies on morality of practitioners. There are many examples of doctors divulging patients' privacy.
We want to propose a scheme to technically protect privacy of embarrassing conversations over the internet. Firstly, entities involved in the communication need to identify each other and they want to deny that they are involved in the communication. For example of criminal suspects and lawyers, the criminal suspect needs to make sure the person he talks to is the particular lawyer he wants to talk to and the criminal suspect wants deny that he is involved. So the feature of The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ahmed M. Elmisery. deniable authentication is needed. Secondly, the receiver in the communication needs to make sure the content of message coming from the sender he is intended to communicate to although he can not prove to a third party that the content of message comes from the sender. In the example of criminal suspects and lawyers, the lawyer has to make sure the content of message coming from the criminal suspect although the layer can not prove to the judge that the content of the message comes from the criminal suspect. So the non-repudiation for content is needed. Thirdly, the content of conversation should not be eavesdropped by others. So the confidentiality is needed. Fourthly, the entities involved in communication need to make sure what he says is integral. So integrity is needed. In a word, there are four features needed.
There are many other application scenarios for the scheme we propose, such as social survey of misconduct. In study of social science, researchers need to survey about people's misconduct, especially when researchers focus on important and realistic problems such as early pregnancy, smoking marijuana and street fight. The scheme we propose can be applied to many application scenarios which are embarrassing but people are involved for some special reasons.
In this paper, we propose an efficient deniable authenticated encryption scheme, which can achieve four features we discuss above and we apply it into medical sensors which monitor patients' condition. The deniable authentication ensures three special properties: (1) an intended receiver can identify the source of a given message; (2) the intended receiver cannot prove the source of this given message to a third party; (3) the intended receiver cannot prove to a third party that the content of this given message comes from the sender. So the deniable authentication is suitable for application scenarios we discuss above.
A. RELATED WORK
In this section, we focus on the existing schemes of deniable authentication. In 1998, Dwork et al. [1] designed a notable DA(deniable authentication) protocol based on concurrent zero-knowledge proof. However, this protocol needs a timing constraint called the (α, β)-assumption. Aumann and Rabin [2] designed another DA protocol based on the factoring problem. In 2001, Deng et al. [3] designed two DA protocols based on the factoring problem and discrete logarithm problem, respectively. The schemes of Deng et al. [3] and Aumann and Rabin [2] both need public directory, which is trusted by sender and receiver. To overcome this weakness, Fan et al. [4] designed a new DA protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [5] . Their protocol uses public key certificates to defeat the person-in-the-middle(PIM) attack and digital signatures to identify the source of a given message. However, Fan et al. [4] showed that the scheme of [4] suffers from an authentication weakness. Because of this weakness, an attacker can easily disguise as a receiver and an inquisitor can easily identify the source of the message. In 2004, Shao [6] designed a noninteractive DA protocol based on the generalized ElGamal signature [7] . In 2005, Lu and Cao [8] designed a noninteractive DA protocol based on the factoring problem. They proved the proposed protocol in the random oracle model. In 2005, Wang et al. [9] designed a DA protocol based on the ElGamal cryptosystem [10] . Their protocol makes use of the inverse of the ElGamal to obtain deniability for the authentication. In 2006, Shao et al. [11] showed that Wang et al.'s [9] protocol is vulnerable to the person-inthe-middle (PIM) attack. An adversary who launches a PIM attack can impersonate a valid user to communicate with the verifier, which would eventually lead to the failure of an online negotiation. In 2010, Yoon et al. [12] demonstrated that Shao et al.'s [11] protocol is still susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack. To mitigate this security breach, a robust deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography was proposed. However, Li and Takagi [13] showed that the scheme of [12] did not satisfy the deniable authentication property. The receiver can show the source of a given message to a third party. Lee et al. [14] designed a novel DA protocol using generalized ElGamal signature. This protocol can furthermore replace the underlying signature scheme in order to retain a secure status even if the previously signature method is broken. Wang and Song [15] designed a non-interactive DA protocol based on the DDH assumption. They borrowed the traditional authentication model to prove the security of the proposed protocol. Li et al. [16] designed an identity-based DA protocol by combining identity-based cryptography and authenticated encryption scheme. Yongjian et al. [17] constructed a protocol using a secure certificateless signature scheme and outsourcing the verification of signature to a cloud server. Li et al. [18] introduced a new concept called deniable authenticated encryption.
B. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we propose an efficient deniable authentication encryption scheme that can achieve confidentiality, integrity, deniable authentication and non-repudiation in a single logical step. The advantages include:
(1) The scheme is non-interactive. It is more efficient than interactive schemes because there is no need to establish communication, which takes up a considerable part of time cost.
(2) The scheme can achieve confidentiality, integrity, deniable authentication and non-repudiation in a single logical step, which reduces steps of the scheme. Firstly, it reduces complexity of the scheme. Secondly, it reduces computational overhead and time cost because intermediate steps are reduced.
We compare our scheme with existing authentication schemes in terms of security features. And we implement our scheme in application of medical sensors. We also compare our scheme with the latest deniable authentication encryption scheme, finding that our scheme reduces computational cost of encryption by about 30%, reduces computational cost of decryption by about 50% and reduces length of ciphertext by about 33%.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, we introduce system model, design goal and complexity assumptions. In section III, our scheme is proposed. In section IV, we conduct theoretical analysis and implementation. Finally, the conclusions are given in section V. Figure 1 illustrates structure of system model which consists of certification authority(CA), medical sensor and data processing center. The medical sensor collects a variety of medical data of patients and sends it to data processing center in ciphertext. The data processing center is responsible for decrypting ciphertext into plaintext and inserts the information into application systems which are aimed at supporting the work of doctors. The certification authority(CA) is responsible for managing the public key of medical sensor and data processing center. The typical processing procedure is demonstrated as Figure 2 . For the convenience of discussion, we use more common names in cryptograph in following section-the role of medical sensor is called sender and the role of data processing center is called receiver.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. DESIGN GOAL
In the proposed scheme, four secure features including integrity, confidentiality, deniable authentication, nonrepudiation are achieved in one single logical step.
Confidentiality: It ensures that only the intended entity knows the contents of the message.
Integrity: It ensures that the content of the message in the process of interaction has not been altered by illegal entities.
Deniable authentication: It enables a receiver to identify the source of a given message and a receiver cannot prove the source of the message to a third entity.
Non-repudiation: The intended receiver cannot prove to a third party that the content of this given message comes from the sender but the receiver can make sure that the content comes from the sender.
Small Overhead: Due to various kinds of devices, some of which are with limited computational resources, small overhead can promote the use of our scheme in wider applications.
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
There is a group G with prime order q and its generator is g. The discrete logarithm (DL) problem in G is to find an integer a ∈ Z * q for given y so that y = g a . Definition 1: If there is no algorithm which at least has an advantage dl to solving the DL problem in t-polynomial time. The( dl , t) − DL assumption is established.
The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G is to find g ab for some unknown a, b ∈ Z * q when (g, g a , g b ) is given.
Definition 2: If there is no algorithm which has an advantage at least dl to solving the CDH problem in t-polynomial time, the( dl , t) − CDH assumption is established.
III. EFFICIENT DENIABLE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION
In this section, we give detailed information about efficient deniable authenticated encryption. The scheme is divided into four phases.
A. SYNTAX
A generic DAE (deniable authenticated encryption) scheme is divided into the following four algorithms.
Setup: This is a probabilistic algorithm which gets security parameter λ and outputs the system parameters param.
Keygen: This is a key generation algorithm which gets the param and generates a public/private key pair (y s , x s ) of sender and a public/private key pair (y r , x r ) of receiver.
DA-Encrypt: This is a probabilistic deniable authenticated encryption algorithm. With the param, a message m, a sender's private key x s , a sender's public y s and a receiver's public y r , sender runs it and outputs a ciphertext σ .
DA-Decrypt: This is a deterministic deniable authenticated decryption algorithm. With the param, a ciphertext σ , a sender's public key y s , a receiver's private key x r and a receiver's public key y r , receiver runs it and outputs the plaintext message m or reject if σ is an invalid ciphertext.
B. SECURITY NOTIONS
A DAE scheme needs to satisfy confidentiality and deniable authentication.
As for confidentiality, widely accepted notion is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) [19] . We accept this notion in our DAE scheme. A challenger C and an adversary A play a game as follows:
Initial: C gets the system param, sender's public/private key pair (y s , x s ) and a receiver's public/private key pair (y r , x r ) by setup algorithm. A gets param, y s and y r from C.
Phase 1: A can issue polynomially bounded number of deniably authenticated encryption queries and deniably authenticated decryption queries. In deniably authenticated encryption query, if A issues query on message m, C gets ciphertext σ by running the deniably authenticated encryption oracle. C sends σ to A. In deniably authenticated decryption query, if A issues query on ciphertext σ , C gets the plaintext m by running the deniably authenticated decryption oracle. If σ is a valid ciphertext, we accept the plaintext m otherwise reject.
Challenge: After Phase 1, A chooses two messages m 0 and m 1 and sends them to C. C randomly chooses one of them donated by m β and encrypts it into σ * by the deniably authenticated encryption oracle. C sends σ * to A as a challenged ciphertext.
Phase 2: There is only one restriction that A cannot issue a deniably authenticated decryption query on the challenged ciphertext σ * . A can issue polynomially bounded number of deniably authenticated encryption queries and deniably authenticated decryption queries. VOLUME 7, 2019 Guess: A generates a bit β , and wins the game if β = β. The advantage of A is defined as
where Pr[β = β] is probability that β is equal to β.
Definition 4: A DAE scheme is ( dae , t, q e , q d ) − IND − CCA secure if there is no adversary A who has an advantage at least dae in the IND-CCA game under the condition that time is probabilistic t-polynomial time, that deniably authenticated encryption queries are at most q e and that deniably authenticated decryption queries are at most q d .
The widely accepted security notion of digital signature is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attack (EUF-CMA) [20] . Here we apply the modified EUF-CMA security notion to DAE schemes and it is called deniable authentication against adaptive chosen messages attack (DA-CMA). One challenger C and one adversary F play the following game:
Initial: C gets the system param, sender's public/private key pair (y s , x s ) and a receiver's public/private key pair (y r , x r ) by setup algorithm. F gets param, y s and y r from C.
Attack: F can perform polynomially bounded number of deniably authenticated encryption queries, deniably authenticated decryption queries, H 1 queries and H 2 queries.
Forgery: F generates a ciphertext σ and F wins the game if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) DA − Decrypt(σ ) = m (b) F dose not issue a deniably authenticated encryption query on message m . The advantage of F is defined as the probability that F wins the game.
A DAE scheme is ( dae , t, q e , q d ) − DA − CMA secure if there is no adversary A who has an advantage at least dae in the IND-CCA game under the condition that time is probabilistic t-polynomial time, that deniably authenticated encryption queries are at most q e and that deniably authenticated decryption queries are at most q d . = (c, e, z) .
C. OUR SCHEME
Deniably
D. CONSISTENCY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the consistency, security requirements.
1) CONSISTENCY
It can be verified by the following equations. The ciphertext σ is indistinguishable from the one which is produced by sender. A random ciphertextσ = (ĉ,ê,ẑ) is one of valid sender's ciphertexts intended to the receiver. The probability Pr (c, e, z) = (ĉ,ê,ẑ) is 1/(q − 1) because (c, e, z) is produced from a randomly chosen value x ∈ z * q .
Similarly, the probability Pr (c, e, z) = (ĉ,ê,ẑ) is 1/(q − 1) because it is produced from x ∈ z * q . That is, both distributions of probability are the same.
Security: Next, we analyze the confidentiality and deniable authentication of our scheme, and they are proved by Theorems 1 and Theorems 2 respectively. Proof: For a given problem instance (g, g a , g b ), C attempts to compute w * = g ab . C as challenger plays the IND-CCA game with A. A can issue encryption and decryption query. A also can issue H 1 and H 2 query. C randomly produces answers which are consistent. C uses list L H 1 to store records for the simulation of the random oracle H 1 and uses list L H 2 to store the records for the simulation of the random oracle H 2 . C uses list L w to store correspondence between w and τ which is an intermediate variable we will use. If A wins the game, C is able to compute w * = g ab by A's queries which contradicts the CDH problem assumption.
Firstly: C gets the system param by the setup algorithm. C randomly produces e * , v * ∈ Z * q , sets y s = (g v * /g a ) ( 1/e * ) mod p which donates public key of sender and sets y r = g b mod p which donates public key of receiver. C sends y s and y r to A. Deniably authenticated encryption queries: When A issues query on ciphertext of a message m, C handles it as follows: C randomly chooses w i ∈ {0, 1} * and k i ∈ {0, 1} n then puts ( The e * is produced by C so A must issue a H 2 query. We can lookup the local list L H 2 for tuple (m i ||y s ||y r ||w i , e i ) such that e i = e * and w i is equal to w * which is the answer for CDH problem instance (g, g a , g b ) .
Next we analyze probability of A to win, which means C can solve CDH problem instance. E 0 represents the event that A issues query H 1 (w * ) during the simulation. According to [21] and [22] , if there is the perfect environment for attack, the E s probability of simulation is equal to that of real attack. During a real attack, there is Proof: Given CDH problem instance (g, g a , g b ), C attempts to compute w * = g ab . C as challenger plays the DA-CMA game with A. A can issue deniably authenticated encryption query and issue deniably authenticated decryption query. A also can issue H 1 query and H 2 query. C randomly produces answers which are consistent. C uses list L H 1 to store records for the simulation of the random oracle H 1 and uses list L H 2 to store the records for the simulation of the random oracle H 2 . C uses list L w to store correspondence between w and τ which is an intermediate variable we will use. If A wins the game, C is able to compute w * = g ab by A s queries which contradicts the CDH problem assumption.
Initial: Firstly, C gets the system param by the setup algorithm. Then, C sets y s = g a as the sender's public key and sets y r = g b as the receiver's public key. C sends y s and y r to F.
Phase 1: C deals with A s queries as follows: H 1 queries: A issues a H 1 query on w. C looks up the local record L H 1 for some (w i , k i ) such that w = w i then returns k i . If w i cannot be found, C chooses randomly k i ∈ {0, 1} n , puts (w, k i ) into local record list L H 1 and returns k i .
H 2 queries: A issues a H 2 query on (m||y s ||y r ||w). C looks up the local record L H 2 for some (m i ||y s ||y r ||w i , e i ) such that (m||y s ||y r ||w) = (m i ||y s ||y r ||w i ) then returns e i . If (m i ||y s ||y r ||w i ) cannot be found, C randomly chooses e i ∈ Z * q , puts (m||y s ||y r ||w, e i )into local record list L H 2 and returns e i .
Deniably authenticated encryption queries: When A issues query on ciphertext of a message m, C handles it as following: C randomly chooses w i ∈ {0, 1} * and We analyze the successful probability of C. E 0 represents the event that F produces a forged ciphertext σ = (c , e , z ) successfully under the condition of not asking the query H 2 (m ||y s ||y r ||w ). We know that
If we provide a consistent simulation, only one of the following independent events can lead to simulation failure. E 1 : H 1 and H 2 encounter a collision, leading that C aborts in encryption query. E 2 : During handling a decryption query, C rejects a valid ciphertext. We know that
and
Therefore, we have 
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS & EXPERIMENT
We compare proposed scheme with existing authentication schemes including [24] - [32] in terms of many secure benefits, which is showed in table 1. The definition of secure benefits and categories of scheme can be seen in [33] . represents that the scheme satisfies a secure benefit; × represents that the scheme does not satisfy a secure benefit. Firstly, there isn't a scheme which satisfies every secure benefit. Secondly, the secure benefits of our scheme are as same as hardware tokens in terms of secure benefits we list in the table. Thirdly, our scheme is better than other schemes in terms of secure benefits we list in the table. We emphasize that it would be simple-minded to rank competing schemes simply by counting how many benefits each offers because each of them is aimed at special application scenario. For example, our scheme is aimed at application scenarios we discuss in the section of introduction. By comparing our scheme with the latest scheme [18] , it is found that both of two schemes have the same security features but our scheme has less computational overhead and shorter ciphertext length. The computational complexity of modular multiplication operation is much higher than other operations in the scheme. Our scheme reduces modular multiplication operation by 1/3 in the encryption, so the computational complexity of the encryption algorithm is approximately reduced by about 30%. Meanwhile, our scheme reduces modular multiplication operation by 2/3 in the encryption, so the computational complexity of the decryption algorithm is approximately reduced by about 66%. Finally our scheme reduces the length of ciphertext by about 30%. The detailed information of comparison is in the Table 2 . For convenience, the following notations are used: T h represents the time to execute a hash function. T e represents the time to execute a modular exponentiation operation. T m represents the time to execute a modular multiplication operation. T i represents the time to execute a modular inverse operation; |χ | represents the size of message χ. represents that this scheme satisfies this property.
We implement the latest scheme and our scheme using MIRACL library [23] on Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine which is installed on an Intel Core i5 2.6 GHz machine with 8G RAM. As for implement of big number cryptography, the MIRACL library is widely accepted as development kit for it easily implementing big number cryptography. We collect 1000 data samples through a medical sensor for our experiments.
In implementation of deniably authenticated encryption, the length of q is 512-bits, and the length of p is 1024-bits. we use eight types of encryption key length that represents 64-bit, 128-bit,192-bit, 256-bit, 320-bit, 384-bit, 448-bits, 512-bits. The Figure 3 respectively gives the computational time (sum time of running 1000 times deniably authenticated encryption) of the latest scheme and our scheme at eight types encryption key length. The experimental results agree with the theoretical analysis. The computational time of the our scheme is obviously lower.
In this implementation of deniably authenticated decryption, the length of q is 512-bits, and the length of p is 1024-bits. we use eight types of decryption key length that represents 64-bit, 128-bit,192-bit, 256-bit, 320-bit, 384-bit, 448-bits, 512-bits. The Figure 4 respectively gives the computational time (sum time of running 1000 times deniably authenticated decryption) of the latest scheme and our scheme at eight types decryption key length. The experimental results agree with the theoretical analysis. The computational time of our scheme is obviously lower. The difference of time between the latest scheme and our scheme becomes bigger as the length of the private key becomes bigger. The reason is that when the length of private key is short, the computational complexity of modular exponentiation operation is slightly higher than that of other operation such as modular multiplication operation. But when the length of private key is longer, the computational complexity of modular exponentiation operation is much higher than that of other operations. The longer private key is more secure, so our scheme is more suitable for some applications which need stronger security. We show the difference between encryption time and decryption time in line chart Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. The Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of improvement of encryption. In the encryption, the percentage does not change as the encryption key is longer. There are three modular exponentiation operations in latest scheme which dominate in computational complexity and the computational complexity of them becomes higher simultaneously when the length of encryption key becomes bigger. We reduce one modular exponentiation operations so the computational complexity should reduce by 33%. But there are still other operations such as hash, modular multiplication operation so the percentage should be smaller than 33%. According to the result of our experiment, the percentage of improvement is approximately about 30%. The Fig 8 illustrates the percentage of improvement in decryption. In the decryption, the percentage increases continuously as the length of decryption key becomes bigger. There are two modular exponentiation operations in latest scheme which dominate in computational complexity and the computational complexity of them becomes higher simultaneously when the length of encryption key becomes bigger. We reduce two modular exponentiation operations so the computational complexity should reduce by 2/3. But there are still other operations such as hash, modular multiplication operation so the percentage should be smaller than 2/3. Through experiments we find out that the modular exponentiation operations take up 75% computational complexity of which we reduce 2/3 so we reduce computational complexity of decryption by approximately 50%. According to the result of our experiment, the percentage of improvement is approximately 48% with 512bit decryption key.
The Figure 9 illustrates the percentage of improvement including both encryption and decryption. The percentage is approximately 37%.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient deniable authentication encryption scheme. Compared with various kinds of authentication scheme, our scheme has good secure benefits. And compared with the latest deniable authentication encryption scheme, our scheme reduces computational cost of encryption by about 30%, reduces computational cost of decryption by about 50% and reduces length of ciphertext by about 33%. The security of our scheme is shown in the random oracle model. After conducting theoretical analysis, we implement our scheme and latest one. According to the results of experiments, performance is in line with the theoretical analysis.
